PALEFACE, REDSKIN, AND THE GREAT WHITE
CHIEFS IN WASHINGTON: DRAWING THE
BATTLE LINES OVER WESTERN
WATER RIGHTS

The semi-arid West is facing an acute water crisis as growing
urbanization, industrialization, and modern agricultural
processes place an ever greater demand on a scarce and vital resource. That crisis is being aggravated by a conflict between
western water laws and the judicially created implied-reservation-of-water rights doctrine, which applies to all Indian reservations andfederally reserved lands. This Comment examines the
conflicts among Indian and federal reserved rights and state
vested water rights in a general stream adjudication. The author
suggests that immediate modification of the implied-reservationof-water rights doctrine is essentialto enable the states to affirmatively administer and apportion state waters to users on a comprehensive basis to combat the growing crisis over western
waters.
INTRODUCTION

Water is an essential commodity for which no substitute exists.
Although it covers most of the earth's surface, surprisingly little is
available to satisfy man's ever increasing needs.' Rapid industrialization, growing urbanization, and large scale irrigation of agri2
cultural lands have caused a major water crisis in the arid West.
1. Less than three percent of the earth's water supply is fresh water. The
major portion of this is locked in the ice masses overlaying the earth's polar regions. A very small remaining fraction constitutes the lakes, streams, and underground water supplies of the world. W. EDDY, JR., G. LEON & R. MaiLNE, CONSIDER
THE PROCESS OF LIvING 44 (1972).
2. In the United States, water use averages 1600 gallons per person each day.
Modern agricultural uses require large quantities of water. For example, rice, a
crop that feeds more people in the world than any other, requires 200 to 250 gallons of water for every pound of rice grown. Approximately 1000 gallons of water
are required to produce a single quart of cow's milk, while 2500 to 6000 gallons are
necessary to produce each pound of meat. Id. at 50. A huge quantity of water is
also utilized in nearly all industrial processes. For example, as the need for energy increases, coal and oil shale resources are being tapped to meet the need.
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As a result of this growing water crisis, the states must take a
more active role in the administration and apportionment of state
waters among users. The states' ability to solve the western
water crisis has been hampered, however, by a federal water
rights doctrine commonly known as the Winters doctrine, or the
doctrine of implied-reservation-of-water rights. In simple terms,
the doctrine of implied-reservation-of-water rights states that
when the federal government made a reservation or withdrawal of
land, it also impliedly reserved sufficient water to fulfill the purpose of the reservation. The quantities of water reserved include
amounts necessary for future as well as present needs of the reservation. The government's water right is not dependent upon
the application of the water to any beneficial use, nor is it forfeited through nonuse. The right has a priority date as of the time
the reservation was originally withdrawn. It is junior only to
those private appropriations dated prior to the reservation's with3
drawal.
The reserved water right is applicable to federal reserved lands
and Indian reservations. 4 Recently, Indian tribes have asserted
expansive reserved water rights. These new demands threaten to
Mining and manufacturing processes for these natural resource reserves require
large amounts of water, diminishing supplies available for human consumption
and agriculture. A 1000-megawatt electric generating station, using an evaporative
tower for cooling and operating at full capacity, requires 20,000 acre-feet of water
annually. A plant producing 250 million cubic feet a day of synthetic natural gas
from coal would require approximately 30,000 acre-feet of water per year. A coal
liquefaction process, whereby synthetic crude oil is extracted from coal, would
consume approximately 65,250 acre-feet of water per year to bring in 100,000 barrels of oil per day. To bring in 2,000,000 barrels of oil shale per day requires the
use of 455,000 acre-feet of water per year. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, REHABILITATION POTENTIAL OF WESTERN COAL LANDS, A REPORT TO THE ENERGY PoucY

PROJECT OF THE FORD FOUNDATION 160 (1973).
3. For a comprehensive review of the doctrine and its history, see Ranquist,
The Winters Doctrine and How It Grew: FederalReservation of Rights to the Use
of Water, 1 B.Y.U. L. REV. 639 (1975).
4. Federal reserved lands should be distinguished from other public domain
lands. Federal reserved lands are those enclaves that are withdrawn from the
public domain for a specified purpose, such as a national park or forest. The term
"public lands" characterizes the remainder of lands owned by the United States,
which are subject to private appropriation and disposal under public land laws.
The implied-reservation-of-water rights doctrine has heretofore not been applied
to these public lands. See id. at 651, 679-82.
The doctrine of reserved water rights is also applicable to all Indian reservations, which may be created by treaty, statute, or Executive order. Id. at 653. See
generally Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); United States v. Walker River
Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939). Indian sovereignty rights are integral
to the reserved water rights doctrine. Indians are accorded special status within
the United States as dependent, sovereign nations. The tribes have powers of selfgovernment within Indian territory. Government of a tribe's internal affairs, therefore, is beyond the reach of states or their political subdivisions, and state water
laws do not apply to Indian tribes absent specific legislation. See generally
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560 (1832).
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diminish the common source of supply and thus reduce the quantities available for established state uses. 5 The Winters doctrine
supports the proposition that newly initiated Indian water uses
have legal superiority over preexisting non-Indian uses. Therefore, the fifth6 and fourteenth 7 amendments to the United States
Constitution, providing that just compensation will be paid for
private property rights taken for public purposes, do not provide a
remedy to private users who suffer monetary losses from that preemption.
Because of the conflict between Indian reserved rights and established non-Indian uses, western waters have become the
source of extensive and emotionally charged legal battles. The
Winters doctrine has been opposed by all the western states
since its creation. 8 The states fear the Winters doctrine may allow massive federal and Indian reserved water rights claims in
the semi-arid West, which would have a crippling economic impact on the western state water users.9 The western states have a
5. For example, in Arizona, tribes sought to enjoin the city of Tucson from
pumping ground water, the city's major water source. United States v. City of Tucson, Civ. No. 75-39 Tuc (JAW) (D. Ariz., order entered October 16, 1975). Further,
Senate Bill 905, introduced in 1977, would have enabled five central Arizona tribes,
constituting 1% of the population of Arizona, to control 36% of the state's total dependable water supply. It proposed to grant them rights over a million additional
acre-feet of surface water, or 92% of the dependable water supply in Pima, Maricopa, and Yuma counties. The city of Phoenix is in Maricopa county. Providing
Water to the Five Central Arizona Indian Tribesfor Farming Operationsand for
Other Purposes: Hearings on S. 905 Before the'Senate Select Committee on Indian
Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 33, 35 (1977) (statements of Senator Barry Goldwater
and Honorable Bob Stump).
6. U.S. CONsT. amend. V, which provides: "No person shall be... deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use without just compensation."
7. Id. amend. XIV, § 1, which provides: "No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law."
8. "In every Supreme Court case since Winters having any relation to the
doctrine of federal reserved water rights, every western state has separately or together with other western states ified an amicus brief in opposition to the position
of the federal government." Grow & Stewart, The Winters Doctrine as Federal
Common Law, 10 NAT. REsouRcEs LAW. 457, 482 n.93 (1977-78).
9. Federal lands are the source of most of the water in the eleven coterminous western states. This provides 61% of the natural runoff of water in the regions, and most of this comes from land the federal government has reserved or
withdrawn from the public domain for specific purposes. The federal government,
according to case law, can claim much and in some cases all of this water. The
effect on 23 million acres of irrigated land in the West and the potential effect on
the world food supply is disastrous. For example, approximately $12.5 billion has
been invested by public and private sources in water storage facilities, and addi-

strong public policy interest in maintaining state control over the
use of the waters within the boundaries of the state. Future economic growth and community development are dependent upon
adequate water supplies. In order for a state to accommodate the
competing needs for water, proper planning and control,
cost/benefit analysis of any proposed use, and administrative jurisdiction over acquisition, use, and distribution of state waters
are required. In addition, the states have an interest in protecting
large investments in water resource projects and water rights considered to have vested under state law.
The federal government has a major interest in water rights on
federal reserved lands. The federal interest in uniform management of public lands, unhindered by compliance with diverse
state water laws, is essential to efficient management of these
public reserves. In addition, Congress has an interest in those
water resource projects throughout the United States that are primarily funded by congressional legislation. The federal government also has an overall interest in the general water resource
policies of the country. As the national water crisis increases, a
national approach to pollution abatement, energy production and
distribution, and interstate water redistribution may be necessary.
Indian water rights differ from other federally reserved water
rights, such as rights for national parks and forests, in that the
United States is trustee for the benefit of the Indians who hold
equitable title. The United States may sell, lease, quitclaim, release, or otherwise convey its own federal reserved water rights.
In contrast, its powers and duties regarding Indian water rights
are constrained by a fiduciary duty to the Indians, who are beneficiaries of the trust.10 However, the fiduciary duty in many aspects
is illusory. The legislative authority of the federal government
over Indian water rights is similar to its authority over Indian
lands.
The power of Congress extends from the control of the use of the lands,
through the grant of adverse interests in the lands, to the outright sale
and removal of the Indians' interest. And this is true, whether or not the
lands are disposed of for public or private purposes. 11

Congress may either increase or diminish the Indian water rights
by statute, because the federal government has plenary power
tional billions have been invested to irrigate the 23 million acres mentioned above,
which are primarily dependent upon public land water yields. About 96% of the
region's 32 million people, and most of its major cities and metropolitan areas are
dependent to some degree on public land water. PuBLic LAND LAw REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE-THmD OF THE NATION's LAND 141 (1970).
10. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 477 (1973).
11. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 36 (1958).
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over Indian water rights and tribal lands. 12 By enforcing reserved
Indian water rights through the trust relationship, the federal government could conceivably gain control over sizable portions of
western waters. After obtaining control of the water through the
trust mechanism, Congress may then unilaterally eliminate any
Indian interest in the water pursuant to plenary legislative authority.13
As national energy needs become more critical, control of western waters will become essential to the recovery of natural energy
resource reserves located throughout the West.14 Huge quantities
of water diverted for industrial and energy contracts reduce the
supplies for established state domestic and agricultural uses.
Western states have been generally unwilling to export state
water resources to neighboring water-needy states, seeking to
preserve sufficient quantities for future developments within their
own states.15 Federal control over redistribution of state waters
has been minimal, absent Congressional authorization for interstate water projects, such as the Boulder Dam Reclamation Project Act16 or controversies involving apportionment of interstate
streams.' 7 The reserved water rights doctrine, however, gives the
federal government a basis for claiming a major portion of waters
in the West.' 8
12. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
13. The plenary authority, however, is not absolute power. The taking must be
founded upon a reasonable basis, and Indians must be given compensation for
lands or rights taken. See United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109-10
(1935).
14. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
15. See, e.g., note 27 and accompanying text infra. The state of Arizona has
consistently opposed exportation of Colorado River waters to California.
16. 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617t (1976).
17. The Supreme Court has discretion to exercise original jurisdiction over interstate stream apportionments. The Supreme Court is the only court where jurisdiction over all parties may be obtained at one time. If the Supreme Court
declines to hear the controversy, separate actions are required in each state, frequently resulting in inconsistent decrees. Interstate apportionment suits may be
ified by the states against each other or initiated by the United States in the
Supreme Court. See Ranquist, supra note 3, at 709-10. See also United States v.
Nevada, 412 U.S. 534 (1973); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Nebraska v.
Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Colorado v. Kansas, 322 U.S. 708 (1944); Washington
v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 805 (1931), modified, 347 U.S. 995 (1954); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); Wyoning v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 496 (1922), vacated and new decree entered, 353 U.S. 953
(1957); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902).
18. SENATE SELECT COMMrTEE ON NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES, S. REP. No.
15, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1961). The United States owns sizable land bases

Federal reserved rights coupled with expansive Indian reserved
water claims could cause states to effectively lose control of the
administration and distribution of a major portion of the waters
currently under exclusive state jurisdiction. The Justice Department has recently filed water adjudication suits concerning watersheds in several western states, increasing the apprehensions of
state water officials and private water rights holders that a federal
and Indian monopoly of western waters could result.1 9 This Comment will examine the problem created by the adjudication of
rights to western waters under the concurrent application of the
reserved water rights doctrine and state water laws, and the effect
the doctrine has on the water rights of the nation's 800,000 Indians, federal land reserves, and millions of private water users in
the West.
THE WINTERS DocNmnE

The Winters doctrine is based on the 1908 Supreme Court decision of Winters v. United States.2 0 In Winters, the federal government brought suit on behalf of Indians on the Fort Belknap
Indian Reservation in Montana, to enjoin upstream farmers from
diverting water from the Milk River for irrigation. The Court held
that the waters of the Milk River, arising on, flowing through, or
bordering the reservation, were impliedly reserved for the Indians as of the date the reservation was created. 21 The Court noted
the policy of the government and the desire of the Indians that
the Indians change their nomadic habits and develop an agrarian
society.22 Because portions of the reserved lands were dry and
arid, large quantities of water would be required for irrigation to
make the lands productive. 23 The right to future use of the water
throughout the West. In Alaska, 96% of the state is under federal ownership Nevada, 87%; Utah, 66%; Idaho, 64%; Oregon, 53%; California, 45%; Colorado, 36%;
New Mexico, 34%; Montana, 30%; and Washington, 297. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, PUBUIC LAND STATisTIcs 10 (1976).
19. See note 151 and accompanying text infra. See also United States v. City
of Tucson, Civ. No. 75-39 Tuc (JAW) (D. Ariz., order entered October 16, 1975);
United States v. Truckee Carson Irrigation Dist., 71 F.R.D. 10 (D. Nev. 1975), Civ.
No. R-2987-JBA (D. Nev., fied Dec. 21, 1973).
20. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
21. Id. at 576-77.
22. Id. at 576.
23. Id. at 566. The Winters Court concluded that the implied-reservation-of-

water rights was necessary in the course of fair dealings with the Indians, as without the water, the Indian reservation lands would have been nearly valueless. Id.
at 576-77. The courts have been liberal in recognizing certain rights not clearly set
out in the individual treaties. Three primary rules of construction have been developed by the courts in relation to Indian treaties. (1) Ambiguous expressions
must be resolved in favor of the Indian parties concerned. McClanahan v. State
Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930);
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was vested in the Indians even though the right was presently not
exercised. The doctrine provides that the Indian reserved water
right cannot be forfeited by nonuse or by state action through
condemnation, inverse condemnation, or statute.24 The federal
government is obligated, as trustee of the Indian reserved water
25
rights, to protect and enforce those rights.
The Supreme Court did not address the Winters doctrine again
for over fifty years. Then in 1963, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine in Arizona v. California,2 6 a comprehensive adjudication of
water rights on the Lower Colorado River Basin. 27 Arizona had
sued the state of California and several of its public agencies.
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908). (2) Indian treaties must be
interpreted as the Indians themselves would have understood them. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S.
111, 116 (1938); Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832). (3) Indian
treaties must be liberally construed in favor of the Indians. Choctaw Nation v.
United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); United States v. Walker River Irrigation
Dist., 104 F.2d 334, 337 (9th Cir. 1939).
24. See Ranquist, supra note 3, at 655.
25. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 256-58 (D.D.C.
1973).
26. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
27. The Colorado River Compact, drawn by representatives of the seven Colorado Basin states in 1922, delineated an equal division of the Colorado River between the Upper and Lower Basins. Lee's Ferry, Arizona, was chosen as the
dividing site, with each basin receiving 7.5 million acre-feet of water annually. In
1949, the Upper Basin share was allotted to Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona by mutual agreement. The Lower Basin states, Arizona, California, Nevada, Utah, and New Mexico, however, could not agree to a division of the
lower 7.5 million acre-feet allotment. Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico participated
in both negotiations, possessing land bases on tributaries in both Upper and
Lower Basins. Arizona, the chief dissenter among the Lower Basin states, also attempted to enjoin the Boulder Dam Project and obtain a judicial apportionment of
the Colorado River in the absence of the United States as a party. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931). The effort failed, and Arizona ratified the Compact in
1944 after exhausting all administrative and judicial attempts to increase its share
of the Colorado River.
In 1955, Arizona again brought suit against California, Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546 (1963), seeking judicial adjudication of water rights on the Colorado River.
The final decree, 376 U.S. 340, 344 (1964), partitioned the 7.5 million acre-feet allotted to the Lower Basin states as follows: California, 4.4 million acre-feet; Arizona,
2.8 million acre-feet; and Nevada, 0.3 million acre-feet. Any annual surpluses were
to be awarded to: California, 50%; Arizona, 46%; and Nevada, 4%. Shortages were
to be divided among the states, projects, and water users in each state by the Secretary of the Interior at his discretion.
Indian tribes received 1 million acre-feet for 135,000 "irrigable acres." Other federal land needs were not specifically quantified, but were awarded in terms of
amounts necessary to fulfill the purposes of the reservation. The amounts used by
federal and Indian reservations were ultimately to be charged against the state in
which the water was used. See Trelease, Arizona v. California: Allocation of

Later, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and the United States became
parties. The initial controversy involved the interstate allocation
of the Colorado River and its tributaries. The federal government
asserted water rights claims on behalf of five Indian reservations
in the Colorado River Basin, 28 several national forests and parks,
and the Boulder Canyon Project Act29 which created the Boulder
Dam Reclamation Project.
In addressing the tribal water claims, the Court held that the
United States had reserved the water rights for the Indians, effective as of the time the Indian reservations were created. The
Court concluded the rights were "present perfected rights," entitled to priority over any later dated water rights. Further, the reservation of water included sufficient quantities to satisfy present
30
and future needs of the reservation.
The Arizona Court not only reaffirmed the viability of the Winters doctrine for Indian reserved rights, but asserted that the doctrine was also applicable to other federal reservations, such as
national parks, forests, recreation areas, and military installations.3 ' The Court held that the amounts of water reserved for
Lake Mead National Recreation Area and Gila National Forest
should also be quantified in terms of sufficient quantities to fulfill
the purposes of the reservation, including amounts for any future
32
requirements.
The Winters doctrine received additional teeth in Cappaert v.
United States.3 3 In Cappaert,the National Park Service sought to
enjoin an adjacent landowner from pumping ground water from
an aquifer supplying Devil's Hole, a deep cavern on federal lands
in

Nevada

harboring an endangered

species of fish.34

The

Supreme Court unanimously held that the United States' intention to appropriate enough water to "maintain the level of the
Water Resources to People, States, and Nation, 1963 Sup. CT. REV. 158, for an indepth review of the holding.
28. Chemehuevi, Cocopah, Yuma, Colorado River, and Fort Mohave Reservations. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 595 n.97 (1963).
29. 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617t (1976).
30. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
31. Id. at 601.
32. Id. See also S. Rm'un, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER, ARIZONA v. CAIIFORNIA 295, 343 (1960).
33. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
34. Devil's Hole was inhabited by a unique, endemic species of desert fish,
traceable to the Pleistocene Era. The pool was reserved in 1952, under the American Antiquities Preservation Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976), authorizing the
President to reserve Devil's Hole and its rare inhabitants for historic or scientific
interests. The pumping had dangerously lowered the water table, exposing a large
rock shelf, the primary spawning area of the Devil's Hole pupfish. The population
was in danger of depletion below an acceptable breeding population. Cappaert v.
United States, 426 U.S. 128, 131-36 (1976).
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pool to preserve its scientific value" was implicit when the United
States withdrew the reservation. 35 Prior to Cappaert, the
Supreme Court had not expressly included ground water in the
implied-reservation-of-water rights doctrine. 3 6 Acknowledging
that necessity was the basis for the creation of the reserved water
rights doctrine, the Court held that the United States could protect both surface and ground water from diversion when necessary to fulfill the purposes of the reservation.3 7 The Court
qualified its holding, however, stating that the implied-reservation-of-water rights doctrine reserved only the "amount of water
necessary to fulfill the purposes of the reservation, no more. ' 38
9
decision, the Winters doctrine
Since the Arizona v. California3
has become firmly rooted in case law. The Supreme Court has
consistently reaffirmed the doctrine in subsequent cases concerning federal and Indian reserved water rights.40 The Winters doctrine was created as an equitable remedy to deal specifically with
Indian tribes where the federal government failed to reserve
water for the tribe's livelihood. Arizona v. California,41 however,
extended the doctrine to apply to all federal reserved lands. The
Cappaertdecision brought all water resources, including ground
and surface waters, within the purview of the doctrine.

35. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 147 (1976).
36. Some lower courts had applied the doctrine of reserved water rights to
ground water, however, prior to Cappaert. See, e.g., Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F.
Supp. 383 (D. Mont. 1968); United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist., 165 F. Supp.

806 (S.D. Cal. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 347 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1965).
37. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 143 (1976). Cappaertcould be distinguished on its facts as involving an endangered species. In addition, the pool
itself was the very purpose for the reservation. Even under prior appropriation
schemes, the government's reservation date preceeded Cappaert's water right
date. The case has, however, consistently been cited as authority in irmplied-reservation-of-water rights cases. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696
(1978).
38. 426 U.S. 128, 141 (emphasis added).
39. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
40. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); Cappaert v.
United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); United States v. District Court of Eagle County,
401 U.S. 520 (1971); United States v. District Court of Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527
(1971).
41. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).

INHERENT PROBLEMS OF JUDIcIAL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICTS
OVER WESTERN WATER RIGHTS

Forum
Title to a water right is not perfected until there has been an
adjudication or legal determination of the right and title is established by decree in a court of proper jurisdiction. 42 Water rights
adjudications are equitable actions to determine and fix the ownership, nature, and extent of rights of user claims to the same
source of supply in relation to each other.43 Absent statutory authorization to administratively determine federal reserved water
rights, state and federal court adjudications are the only means to
perfect water rights and determine the relationship between reserved water claims and water rights established under state
laws. Traditionally, federal and Indian reserved water claims
have been adjudicated solely in federal courts, 44 which hindered
final resolution of water rights controversies involving both state
and federally reserved water rights. Indian tribes and the federal
government are political sovereigns, and they are immune from
45
suit absent express Congressional authority or tribal consent.
Without consent of the government or the tribe, a state water
user was unable to obtain a final adjudication of his water rights
in relation to any federal or Indian claims.
To alleviate the harshness of this consent requirement, Congress enacted legislation, popularly known as the McCarran
Amendment, consenting to joinder of the United States as a party
in general water rights adjudications. 46 The McCarran Amend42. 3 C. KINNEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IRRIGATION AND WATER

RIGws

2755 (2d ed. 1912).
43. Id. at 2756-57.
44. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); Cappaert v.
United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); United
States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908);
United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 988 (1957), rev'd, 330 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.), rehearingdenied, 338 F.2d 307 (9th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924 (1965); Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 161 F.
829 (9th Cir. 1908).
45. United States v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940). "It
has heretofore been shown that the suability of the United States and the Indian
Nations, whether directly or by cross action, depends upon affirmative statutory
authority. Consent alone gives jurisdiction to adjudge against a sovereign. Absent
that consent the attempted exercise of judicial power is void." Id.
46. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976), which provides in part:
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1)
for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other
source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that
the United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water
rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or
otherwise, and the United States... shall be subject to the judgments,
orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain re-
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ment is silent regarding Indian reserved water rights held in trust
by the United States. However, in a surprising decision, the
Supreme Court held in Colorado River Water ConservationDistrict v. United States, conjointly with Akin v. United States,47 that
the McCarran Amendment did not diminish the federal district
court jurisdiction; rather, the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over reserved water rights for both Indian tribes and other
federal reserved lands. 8 The Court dismissed the federal suit in
Akin, finding that concurrent federal proceedings were inadvisable. Primarily, the Court noted the "clear federal policy evinced
by [the McCarran Amendment] is the avoidance of piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a river system."49 The Court interpreted the legislation as "bespeak[ing] a policy that recognizes
the availability of comprehensive state systems for adjudication
of water rights as a means for achieving these goals."5 0
In Akin, the Government, on behalf of the Indians, contended
that absent express Congressional authorization Indian water
rights should not be subjected to state court jurisdiction. They asserted that the federal courts are the only proper forum for adjudication of Indian water rights, and subjecting their claims to
state court adjudication was a direct breach of the United States'
view thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.
47. 424 U.S. 800 (1976). Akin v. United States was renamed Colorado River
Water Conservation Districtv. United States on appeal. Mrs. Akin was unable to
finance the appeal and lost the alphabetical preference enjoyed in the lower court
decision. The case is commonly referred to as Akin by legal scholars, however,
and will hereafter be called Akin v. United States in this Comment.
48. Id. at 809. Prior to Akin, Colorado enacted legislation establishing seven
regional water divisions in the state. See Colorado Water Rights Determination
and Administration Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-92-101 to 37-92-602 (1976).
Each division would be involved in continuous settlement of water claims. The
United States brought suit in federal district court against some 1000 Colorado
water users in Division Seven, seeking adjudication of water rights on behalf of
itself and certain Indian tribes, invoking the jurisdictions of the district court
under 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1976) which provides: "Except as otherwise provided by
Act of Congress, the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States, or by any agency or
officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress." In a separate action, one of the federal suit defendants sought to make the United States a party
in a state proceeding, pursuant to the McCarran Amendment, so that all claims
could be adjudicated in one forum. 424 U.S. at 804-06.
49. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 819
(1976).
50. Id.

fiduciary duty to Indian tribes.5 ' The Akin Court dismissed the
contention that state adjudications would breach the government's fiduciary duty to protect Indian rights:
Mere subjection of Indian rights to legal challenge in state court, however,
would no more imperil those rights than would a suit brought by the Government in district court ... to resolve conflicting claims to a scarce resource. The Government has not abdicated any responsibility fully to
interests may be satisfactodefend Indian rights in state court, and Indian
52
rily protected under regimes of state law.

The rationale of the Akin Court is convincing. Should the federal court decline to hear the state claims along with the reserved
water claims, a danger of inconsistency between the federal and
state decrees is present. This consideration should outweigh the
contentions that Indian water rights will not receive just adjudication in state courts before judges elected by a popular, non-Indian
majority.5 3 Because federal court judges are appointed by a nonIndian President and approved by a non-Indian Congress, the asserted danger of bias is possible in either the state or the federal
court system. Local state judges are generally more knowledgeable about local water resources, uses, and state laws; and they are
competent to apply federal law as well.
The Akin decision does not grant across-the-board approval for
dismissing federal and Indian water rights suits filed in federal
district court in favor of state adjudications. The Court indicated
the dismissal was warranted on the facts in Akin.54 The Court declined to decide if the same result would occur if state proceedings were inadequate to resolve the federal claims, if less
51. Critics point out that 25 U.S.C. § 1322(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1976) provide that:
[Nothing in these sections] shall authorize alienation ... of real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or... held
in trust by the United States ... inconsistent with any federal treaty,
agreement, or statute, ... ; or shall confer jurisdiction upon the state to
adjudicate the ownership of right to possession of such property or any interest therein.
The Akin Court construed the sections, however, as not limiting the special consent to jurisdiction given in the McCarran Amendment, because under the rule of
construction a specific statute is not nullified by a general statute, regardless of
priority of enactment. 424 U.S. at 812-13 n.20 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 550-51 (1974)).
52. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 812
(1976).
53. See Indian Water Rights: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practiceand Procedureof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,94th Cong., 2d Sess.
51-66 (1976) (statements of Wendell Chino, President, National Tribal Chairman's
Association (NTCA), and President, Mescalero Apache Tribe; Mel Tonasket, President, National Congress of American Indians; Daniel Old Elk; President, Native
American Nat'l Resource Dev. Fed'n (NANRDF); and Thomas W. Fredericks, Native American Rights Fund).
54. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 820
(1976).
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extensive state water rights were involved, or if more extensive
proceedings had already occurred in federal court.55 It is possible
that the federal adjudication would not be dismissed in favor of
state proceedings where the state lacks a comprehensive state
water rights adjudication system.
To ensure the efficient resolution of water rights controversies
in state courts, specialized state water adjudication systems
should be established to provide for the comprehensive, continuous adjudication of water rights throughout the state. The system
established by Colorado in the Colorado Water Rights Determination and Administration Act 56 found favor with the Supreme

Court and provided compelling justification for dismissing the
Akin controversy in favor of the state proceedings. By providing
a separate system solely to adjudicate water claims within predetermined regions of the state, controversies could be handled efficiently and brought to a rapid conclusion rather than becoming
mired within crowded federal and state court dockets.
Quantificationof Reserved Winters DoctrineRights
The quantum of water reserved under the doctrine of impliedreservation-of-water rights is elusive. In Winters v. United
States57 .the Court held that the doctrine applied to all waters
arising on, flowing through, or bordering on the reservation.5 8 Extensive application of that standard would have a harmful economic impact on western states with limited water supplies. One
study has indicated that sixty-one percent of the 363 million acrefeet of water arising in the eleven western states originates in national forests and national parks.5 9 Indian reserved water claims
and uses are more expansive than water claims for federal reserved lands. If the courts were to extend the doctrine to its utmost by liberal application of the "arising on" standard, states
could lose administrative control of the major portion of state waters. As currently applied, the doctrine of reserved water rights
places senior federal and Indian water rights above any junior
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-92-101 to 37-92-602 (1976).
207 U.S. 564 (1908).
Id. at 576-77.

59. C. WHEATLEY, C. CoP,_EI, T. STETSON, & D. REED, STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT AND USE OF WATER RESOURCES ON THE PUBLIC LANDS 402-06,

and table 4 (1969).

state water rights. Strict application of the doctrine would disallow even minimal domestic (household) uses by state water
users in times of shortage or where water supplies are limited.60
The reservation of an unspecified quantum of water, exempt from

state appropriation laws, makes the state appropriation systems
largely unadministratable. 61
The Supreme Court has not delineated the exact purposes for
which Winters doctrine rights apply. Rather, the doctrine is expressed in terms of reserving "that amount of water necessary to
fulfill the purpose of the reservation." 62 Determination of the purpose of the reservation is left to court interpretation on a case-bycase basis. 6 3 The courts have adopted varying standards for
quantifying reserved water rights.64 Three primary approaches
65
have emerged from the court decisions.
Methods of Quantifying Reserved Water Rights
The open-ended method of quantifying reserved water rights
permits extension of the right to the ultimate needs of the tribe.
In 1908, the Ninth Circuit held in Conrad Investment Co. v. United
60. See, e.g., United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957), rev'd, 330 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1964), rehearing
denied, 338 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924 (1965), holding that
"Indians [are] awarded the paramount right regardless of the quantity remaining
for the use of white settlers .... It is plain if the amount awarded ... for the
benefit of the Indians... equaled the entire flow... the decree would have been
no different." Id. at 327.
61. Palma I, Indian Water Rights: A State Perspective After Akin, 57 NEB.L.
REv. 295, 311 (1978), indicates:
From the states' standpoint, there is an imperative need to inventory Indian water requirements and to adjudicate and quantify Indian rights so
that their relationship to non-Indian rights can be established. Without a
reasonable quantification, Indian water rights claims may become so expanded by conceptualistic thinking that a situation of chaos will be created in the appropriation system.
62. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976).
63. The Court in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908), for example,
stated that the reservation was established to induce the Indians to relinquish
their nomadic habits and to become a civilized and pastoral people. Similarly, the
Court in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963), recognized the agrarian purposes of the reservation and quantified tribal reserved rights in terms of "irrigable
acreage." But cf. United States v. Truckee Carson Irrigation Dist., 71 F.R.D. 10 (D.
Nev. 1975), Civ. No. R-2987-JBA (D. Nev., filed Dec. 21, 1973), in which the Pyramid
Lake Tribe sought a decree for sufficient water to maintain the lake and its
fisheries. Quantification in terms of irrigable acreage is inappropriate for that purpose, and the Court would have to fashion an alternative standard, perhaps in
terms of minimum depths or inlet flows.
64. Quantification of water rights refers to determining the specific quantum,
or portion of water, comprising a water right. The standard of measure is variable,
including but not limited to acre-feet, miner's inches, and irrigable acreage.
65. For a review of the various standards and their relative merits, see Note, A
Proposalfor the Quantifiationof Reserved Indian Water Rights, 74 COLUM. L.
REv. 1299 (1974).
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States6 6 that the "amount of water [that] will be required may
not be determined with absolute accuracy ... but the policy of
the government [is] to reserve whatever water... may be reasonably necessary, not only for present uses, but for future requirements .... -"67 The court permitted non-Indians to continue
to use surplus waters from the creek subject to the understanding
that paramount Indian rights extended to the ultimate needs of
the Indians and the development of Indian agriculture on the reservation. 68 When the Indian needs increased, the tribe could seek
modification of the decree, even if the modification eliminated all
non-Indian uses. 69 The displaced state beneficial uses were not
compensable because no portion of the reserved rights had been
open to appropriation or acquisition under state law by the defendants or their predecessors.7 0 This open-ended approach
harbors economic hardship for state users. Established, nonreserved water rights are threatened by subsequent preemption
whenever increased reserved rights are exercised. Because the
ultimate needs of the reservation relate back to the original date
of the creation of the reservation, established state beneficial uses
must cease in favor of reserved water rights should insufficient
surplus waters be available for increased Indian and federal
needs. Being junior to reserved water rights, displaced state beneficial uses are not compensable.
A second approach to the quantification of reserved rights issue
requires a need and use prerequisite. At least one court permanently quantified the reserved tribal claims by imposing a requirement of foreseeable Indian needs and uses. 7 1 Limiting the
reserved right to the reasonable needs and uses in existence on
the reservation at the time of quantification eliminates the preemption of established state uses, an inherent problem of the
open-ended approach. Whenever non-Indian uses are subject to
preemption, users must gamble in making large investments for
water-related developments on streams where reserved claims
66. 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908).
67. Id. at 832.
68. See generally id. at 834-35.
69. Id. at 835.
70. See generally id., indicating that Indian rights are prior and paramount to
defendant's rights. Accord, United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321
(9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957), rev'd, 330 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1964),
rehearingdenied, 338 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924 (1965).
71. Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D. Mont. 1968).

exist. Therefore, most users are unwilling to assume that risk,
and development on the streams is inhibited. With a permanent
court decree establishing the rights of all parties concerned, all
classes of users are able to develop the water resource without
fear of future preemption of their established water rights and
uses. However, the need and use prerequisite approach has been
severely criticized because its application tends to establish the
Indian reserved water rights at artificially low levels because of
the minimal level of development currently existing on Indian
72
reservations.
The third approach to quantifying Indian reserved water rights
was set out by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California.73 The
"irrigable acreage" standard is the most definitive and widely accepted policy for quantifying Indian reserved water rights. The
Supreme Court rejected Arizona's argument that the amount of
water should be quantified according to reasonably foreseeable
needs. The Court stipulated that the number of Indians living on
the reservations in the future and projected water needs for those
Indians are too speculative to use as a basis for permanent quantification of water rights.74 The Court also rejected the proposal of
equitable apportionment of the water according to the supply and
the needs of both the Indian and non-Indian water users. 75 The
doctrine of equitable apportionment is a judicially created doctrine for resolving interstate water controversies.76 Because Indian tribes are not states, the Court declined to apply the
equitable apportionment standard in deference to the irrigable
77
acreage standard.
The Supreme Court suggested that quantification on every reservation was appropriate, but stopped short of setting a universal
standard for quantifying reserved rights.78 On the facts in Arizona, the Court concluded that the only feasible and fair way by
which to measure the reserved rights was to determine and allocate water needs for the "practicably irrigable acreage" on the
reservation. 79 Although there has been some criticism of the irrigable acreage standard, it has been generally accepted as the best
72. See Note, A Proposalfor the Quantification of Reserved Indian Water
Rights, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1314 (1974), for a discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages of the need and use approach.
73. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
74. Id. at 600-01.
75. Id. at 601.
76. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95-118 (1907), holding that each state
should enjoy the equitable apportionment of benefits from the flow of a river.
77. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597 (1963).
78. See generally id. at 600-01.
79. Id. at 600.

Comments

[VOL. 17: 449, 1980]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

solution to the problem.8 0 Critics of the irrigable acreage approach assert that the Indian reserved rights are not confined to
irrigation, but extend to any beneficial uses. 81 They fear quantification in terms of agrarian purposes may severely hamper modern industrial, resource, and energy development on the
reservations. Citing the Winters case, they assert the tribes have
82
water rights for both "agriculture and the arts of civilization,"
83
construing the latter to include industrial and any other uses.
Proponents of the "irrigable acreage" standard assert that it does
not limit permissible uses of the water. Once the water is quantified based on the "irrigable acreage," it may be used for other
purposes. Support for this view is found in Arizona v. Califor80. For a critical view of the irrigable acreage standard, see Note, A Proposal
for the Quantification of Reserved Indian Water Rights, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1299
(1974). The author points out that the irrigable acreage standard awards tribes
much more water than they need, as the reservations contain many more acres
than can practicably be put to use. For example, the author indicated that "the
maximum amount of water allocated for the Fort Mojave Reservation was based
on its 18,974 acres, even though no more than twenty-three acres had ever been
irrigated and the population at the time of the award consisted of one family." Id.
at 1312 n.80. The author further pointed out that:
[F]ive Indian Reservations in the Lower Colorado River Basin were
awarded one million acre-feet of water per year, or about 15 per cent of
the Lower Basin supply. Of this million, about 200,000 acre-feet had been
put to use at the time of the trial, although some of the withdrawals dated
back to 1865, and the rights they reserved thus had first priority on the
lower river.... If the full one million acre-feet is put to use on the reservations, Los Angeles is likely to receive no water from the Colorado River,
although it has spent $500 million on an aqueduct to import 1.3 million
acre-feet per year.
Id. (citing Meyers, Book Review, 77 YALE L.J. 1036, 1042 n.15 (1968), cited in F.
TRELEASE, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW 125, 126 (1971)).

81. See Bloom, Indian ParamountRights to Water Use, 16 RocKY MTN.MIN. L.
INST. 669, 691 (1971) (citing W. VEEDER, WINTERS DocTRINE RIGHTS IN THE VIIssouRi

RIVER BASIN, MS. 1, 19 (1965)):
Industrial and/or municipal uses of water are becoming increasingly important on the reservations. Generation of hydroelectricity, generation of
electricity by steam, the mining of coal or minerals, recovery of gravel, on
the reservation all call for the exercise of Winters Doctrine Rights. Where
industrial uses become important, municipal needs usually must be met.
There are established methods for determining the quantities of water
needed for each of the purposes mentioned. They will, of course, govern
the measure of the rights which must be asserted on behalf of the Indians.
There are reservations where the land is so poor that the Winters Doctrine Rights are perhaps the only resource of value. Sale or lease of water
on Indian reservations may thus prove to be the highest, best or most
profitable use under those circumstances.
82. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908).
83. See Veeder, Water Rights in the Coal Fields of the Yellowstone River Basin, 40 LAw & CoNrrEmp. PROB. 77, 89 (Winter 1976).

nia,84 in which the special Master emphasized that although the
standard for quantification was defined by irrigable acreage, the
uses to which the Indians could apply the water was not limited.
He stated, "I hold only that the amount of water reserved and
hence the magnitude of the water rights created is determined by
agriculture and related requirements, since when the water was
reserved that was the purpose of the reservation." 85
Trend Toward Limiting Non-Indian Reserved Water Rights
Claims
In 1978, the Supreme Court limited the scope of the implied-reservation-of-water rights doctrine for non-Indian reserved water
rights in United States v. New Mexico.86 The United States Forest
Service sought to preserve minimum instream flows in the Gila
National Forest for aesthetic, environmental, recreational, and
fish-preservation purposes. 87 The Forest Service asserted that the
Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 196088 expanded the purposes for which the forest was reserved and that increased water
uses and needs arising under the Act should relate back to the
date of creation of the forest. Although the Court acknowledged
that the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 was intended to
broaden the purposes for which national forests had previously
been administered, the Court refused to apply the doctrine to this
later expanded purpose. The Court limited the doctrine to the
original purposes for which the forest was reserved.8 9 The New
Mexico Court expressed concern that where "a river is fully
appropriated, federal reserved water rights [would] frequently require a gallon-for-gallon reduction in the amount of water avail84. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
85.

S. RxiND,REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER, ARIZONA V. CALIFORNIA

295,

254, 265 (1960).
86. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
87. Id. at 705. Gila National Forest's reserved water rights were also the subject of adjudication in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). At that time, the
Supreme Court quantified the rights only in terms of amounts necessary to fulfill
the purposes of the reservation. See Arizona v. California, decree, 376 U.S. 340, 350
(1964).
88. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1976) provides that:
It is the policy of Congress that the national forests are established and
shall be administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed,
and wildlife and fish purposes. The purposes of this Act are declared to
be supplemental to, but not in derogation of, the purposes for which the
national forests were established as set forth in [the Organic Administration Act of 1897] ....
89. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 713 (1978). The Court found that
"Congress intended forests to be reserved for only two purposes, 'to conserve the
water flows and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the people.'" Id. at
706-08 (citing 30 CONG. REC. 967 (1896) (remarks of Congressman McRae)).
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able for a water-needy state and private appropriators." 90
Further, the Court noted that quantifying reserved water rights of
the national forests is of critical importance in the West, where
water is scarce. 9 1
The New Mexico decision is limited to non-Indian reserved
water rights on its facts. Although the Court in Arizona v. California9 2 found no reason to distinguish between Indian and other

federal reserved rights, the Supreme Court might not limit the
Winters doctrine rights to the original, primarily agrarian, purposes of the Indian reservations. However, Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority in New Mexico, cited Winters v. United
States93 for the proposition that the Court must examine both the
asserted water right and the specific purposes for which the land
was reserved when quantifying implied-reservation-of-water
rights. 9 4

Proposed Expansion of Indian Winters Doctrine Rights
William Veeder of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, adamantly asserts that Indian reserved rights should not be limited to the original purposes of the Indian reservations. 95 Veeder, a proponent of
expansive Indian reserved rights, claims that Indian reserved
rights differ significantly from the rights to the use of water on
other federal lands.9 6 Veeder and other proponents of this view
90. Id. at 705.
91. Id. (citing C. WHEATLEY, STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND
USE OF WATER RESOURCES ON THE PUBLIC LANDS 211 (1969)).
92. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
93. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
94. 438 U.S. 700 n.4 (1978).
95. Veeder, Water Rights in the Coal Fields of the Yellowstone River Basin,40
LAW & CONTEMAP. PROB. 77, 89 (Winter 1976).
96. Veeder argues that the Indians themselves, not the federal government,
have reserved the waters on tribal lands and that the tribes have a right independent of the government's assertion of the right on their behalf because of their immemorial occupancy of the land. Veeder bases his view on the Supreme Court
case of United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905), "[T]he treaty was not a
grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them--a reservation of
those not granted." The Winans case, however, dealt with express, tribal fishing
rights and not implied-reservation-of-water rights. There is some danger in adopting the view espoused by Veeder. If the water rights were reserved by the Indians
at the time the treaty was negotiated, the doctrine would conceivably be inapplicable to Indian reservations created by statute or Executive order, resulting in no
water rights for these tribes without an express reservation. In addition, such an
interpretation may restrict reserved rights to the minimal levels in use at the time
of the treaty negotiations. Veeder's position is not widely accepted. See Ranquist,

treat the Indian rights as being appurtenant to the land and usable for any beneficial, present, or future uses. They assert the Indians own "prior and paramount" rights to any waters and
streams that border or traverse their tribal lands because of the
Indians' "immemorial occupancy" of the land.97 This expansive
proposal would not limit the doctrine's application to the original
purpose of the Indian reservation or even to unlimited uses for
that purpose. Under the theory of immemorial rights, reserved
Indian water rights would extend to industrial uses, potential energy development projects, and possibly even to wholesale distribution of reserved water rights off the reservation.
Indian water rights which would not be limited to agrarian purposes are of major economic importance to Indian and non-Indian
water users. Vast coal reserves underlie many of the western Indian reservations. The Fort Berthold Reservation in North Dakota and the Fort Peck and Northern Cheyenne Reservations in
Montana are completely underlain by coal-bearing rock. Other
area reservation percentages include: Cheyenne River, 20%;
Standing Rock, 33%; Blackfeet, 70%; Rocky Boy, 90%; Wind River,
40%; and Crow, 60%.98 Large amounts of water would be necessary for the development of a coal industry on a reservation for
the benefit of the tribe. 99 Diversion of water for industrial water
service contracts and developing new energy supplies under the
reservation doctrine would greatly diminish the amount of water
available for state allocated domestic and irrigation uses.
Marketing Reserved Water Rights
The most controversial proposed use for reserved water rights
is the marketing of reserved rights by the federal government or
Indian tribes for off-reservation uses. 10 0 The sale or lease of Insupra note 3, at 654-55 nn. 58-59, for an example of one scholar's view. See also
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908), holding that: 'The power of the
Government to reserve the waters and exempt them from appropriation under the
That the Government did reserve
state laws is not denied, and could not be ....
them we have decided, and for a use which would be necessarily continued
through the years."
97. Veeder, Indian Priorand ParamountRights to the Use of Water, 16 RocKY
MT. MiN. I INST. 631 (1971).
98. Indian Water Rights: HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 98, table 1.1 (1976) (Initial Report, Daniel Old Elk, President, Native American Nat'l Resource Dev. Fed'n (NANRDF)).
99. See text accompanying note 2 supra (indicating the amounts of water
needed for developing new energy sources).
100. For example, on February 24, 1975, the Secretaries of the Army and Interior entered into a Memorandum of Understanding concerning marketing of surplus water from six reservoirs on the main stem of the Missouri River. See
Memorandum from Morris Thompson, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to Rogers
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dian waters has been characterized as the highest, best, or most
profitable use of a valuable Indian resource.1 0 ' However, permitting wholesale disposal of federal reserved water rights could con02
ceivably result in total destruction of state water law schemes.
Allowing Indians unlimited quantities of water under Winters
doctrine rights could result in upstream junior state water users,
who presumed the state had vested water rights in them, paying
the downstream senior water rights owners for long established
uses. 0 3 No case law directly addresses the issue.
The courts have addressed alienation of Indian water rights
primarily in the context of transfer of individual Indian
allottee lands.10 4 Section 7 of the General Allotment Act of
C.B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior (Feb. 24, 1975). The purpose was to expedite
plans for using large amounts of coal in the Dakotas, Montana, and Wyoming, for
developing new energy supplies, and for permitting execution of industrial service
contracts of approximately 1 million acre-feet of water designated for future irrigation use on Bureau of Reclamation projects. The irrigation projects were intended
to serve both Indian and state users. The Memorandum provided that the Secretary of the Interior shall determine how much surplus water was available for sale
for industrial contracts without benefit of state participation or input. Some of the
contracts would require sale of state waters to industrial users in neighboring
states. The Memorandum generated a great deal of concern among officials of
western states. They feared this unilateral action by the federal government foreshadowed expansive government domination of unappropriated waters on federal
installations, without federal consideration of state appropriation procedures and
policies, and a sacrifice of local needs and benefits for national energy policies.
See Veeder, Water Rights in the Coal Fields of the Yellowstone River Basin, 40
LAw & CONrTEMP. PROB. 77 (Winter 1976); Comment, Marketing of Surplus Water
from FederalReservoirs, 13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 835 (1978).
101. Bloom, Indian Paramount Rights to Water Use, 16 RocKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 669, 691 (1971) (citing W. VEEDER, WNERs DOCTRmNE RIGHTS m THE MIssoum
RIVER BASIN, Ms. 1, 19 (1965)).
102. Id. The author comments: "[T] he ownership and exercise of a first right to
an unlimited quantity of water in western streams by Indian Tribes outside the
jurisdiction of state water officials would give rise to a chaotic situation."
103. In contrast, Professor Tfrelease, Dean of the University of Wyoming College of Law and noted water law authority, supports the recommendation of the
Public Land Law Review Commission, that compensation be paid to state users
whenever the utilization of the implied-reservation-of-water rights doctrine interferes with uses vested under state laws prior to the 1963 Arizona v. Californiadecision. Citing the compensation provisions of the 1902 Reclamation Act and the
1920 Federal Power Act, the Commission found no reason for a different policy involving public land programs. As a matter of fairness and equity, the Commission
found it appropriate to compensate holders of vested state water rights, whose
uses are curtailed through federal reliance on the implied-reservation-of-water
rights doctrine, expressing the belief that potential costs to the government would
be relatively low. See Trelease, Water Resources on the Public Lands PLLRC's Solution to the Reservation Doctrine, 6 LAND & WATER L. REV. 89, 98-99 (1970).
104. An allottee is a member of the tribe holding title to reservation lands who

1887105 provides:
In cases where the use of land for irrigation is necessary to render the
lands within any Indian reservation available for agricultural purposes,
the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to prescribe such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to secure a just and equal distribution
thereof among the Indians residing upon any such reservation .... 106

Indian rights advocates argue that the General Allotment Act
does not partition the water, but rather that the Act allots only a
use right, retaining common ownership of the actual Winters doctrine right in the tribe. However, in United States v. Powers,0 7
the Supreme Court held that
under the Treaty of 1868 waters within the Reservation were reserved for
the equal benefit of the tribal members ... and that when allotments of
land were duly made for exclusive use and thereafter conveyed in fee, the
right to use some portion of the tribal waters essential for cultivation
passed to the owners. 10 8

Thus, when a reservation is allotted, the Winters doctrine rights
pass to the allottee and become appurtenant to the allotted land.
The Powers Court, however, did not rule on the extent or precise
nature of the rights which passed to the allottees. 0 9 Defining the
exact nature of the appurtenant water right is critical where In-

dian allottees sell their land to non-Indian parties." 0

In United States v. Ahtanum IrrigationDistrict,"' the Ninth
Circuit held that transferees of fee patented Indian allotments acquire a vested water right interest upon acquisition of the allotreceives a fee patented title pursuant to the Indian General Allotment Act of 1887,
ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, as amended 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 339, 341-42, 348-49, 354, 381
(1976).
105. Id.
106. 25 U.S.C. § 381 (1976).
107. 305 U.S. 528 (1939).
108. Id. at 532.
109. Id. at 533.
110. See G. HALT, THE FEDERAT-INDLAN TRUST RELATIONSHIP 91 app. E (1979),

listing the percentages of allotted tribal trust lands on all reservations in the
United States. In some cases 100% of the tribal lands have been allotted under the
General Allotment Act. Much of the allotted land has now passed to non-Indian
owners, largely as a result of the problems associated with heirship. State laws of
descent and partition apply to allotments, 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1976). About half of the
allotted land in heirship status is owned by six or more heirs, fractionalizing the
ownership to such an extent that a reasonable economic return is not achievable
for farming and ranching purposes. Any one of the heirs is generally unable to
afford to purchase the land from other heirs, so the allotment is placed on the market for sale. Indians have historically been less than successful at obtaining commercial credit for land purchases, and Bureau of Indian Affairs credit programs
are minimal. The result is a continual transfer of Indian allotted lands to non-Indian owners, reducing the tribal land base. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 216-17 (1945). See also Williams, Too Little Land, Too Many Heirs-The Indian Heirship Land Problem, 46 WASH. L. REV. 709, 712-19 (1971).
111. 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957), rev'd, 330 F.2d
897 (9th Cir. 1964), rehearing denied, 338 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 924 (1965).
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ment. The vested right of the transferee is identical to rights of
original allottees, including a priority date relating back to the
original date of the reservation." 2 Thus, the non-Indian allottees
are beyond the scope of the state statutory appropriation
schemes. Adopting the view of the Ahtanum court would permit
expansion of the transferee's use right along with other Indian reserved water rights. In an earlier case, however, United States v.
Hibner,"13 an Idaho district court had limited the use right of successors in interest, holding:
[T] he white man, as soon as he becomes the owner of the Indian lands, is

subject to those general rules of law governing the appropriation and use
of the public waters of the state, and would, as grantee of the Indian allotments, be entitled to a water right for the actual acreage that was under
irrigation at the time title passed .... 114

The Hibner court gave the non-Indian successor a limited water
right with a priority date of reservation establishment. The court
did not give him a full-fledged Winters doctrine right, however, or
exclude the successor from the application of state law. The
Hibner decision seems to be a more equitable solution. It confines the expanded Winters doctrine right to the persons it was intended to benefit and eliminates the removal of a small number of
non-Indian state citizens from the jurisdiction of state water
laws.115
112. Id. at 342.
113. 27 F.2d 909 (E.D. Idaho 1928).
114. Id. at 912.
115. Since this Comment was accepted for publication, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that all water rights are excluded when
Indian land is acquired by non-Indians. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 80 Daily Journal DA.R. 2440 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 1980). The court concluded that
Walton acquired no reserved water rights with his allotment for two reasons: 1)
no water was originally reserved for non-Indian use and 2) the history and purpose of the Allotment Act demonstrated that Congress would not have intended
non-Indians to acquire reserved rights. The Ninth Circuit based its conclusion on
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978), which mandates that reserved
rights be narrowly construed to include a reservation of sufficient waters to fulfill
the original purposes of the reservation and no more. Since the original purpose
of the reservation in this instance was to "isolate the Indians, to establish them in
a homeland, and to convert them to a 'pastoral and civilized people,"' reserving
water for non-Indian owners would not fulfill these purposes and "be inconsistent
with the basic nineteenth century Indian policy of isolation." 80 Daily Journal
D.A.R. at 2440. In addition, the court felt that Congress would have disapproved
the transferability of the reserved right as inconsistent with the Allotment Act.
The court projected that transferring the reserved right would encourage non-Indians to purchase allotments and would enable the Indians to sell their allotments
at higher prices, further encouraging alienation of the Indian land base, in derogation of the dominant purpose of the Act-permitting Indian fee ownership of land

Absent Supreme Court determination, the issue of alienation
and marketing of reserved water rights remains open. Whether or
not the Court would greatly expand tribal Winters doctrine rights
even after a tribe had disposed of much of their allotted lands and
appurtenant water rights remains undetermined. In addition,
whether the Indians may enter the realm of marketing reserved
water rights for off reservation uses remains to be decided.
Recommendations for Quantifying Reserved Water Rights
In view of the trend of the Supreme Court to limit reserved
rights to original purposes to avoid excessive interference with established state uses, wholesale marketing of reserved rights is beyond the normal interpretation of original purposes. Under
principles of equity, it would be inconsistent for the Court to allow expansive Winters doctrine rights to divest established state
uses, considered to have vested under state laws, without compensation. A better view would be to limit proposed marketing of
reserved water rights to any available, unappropriated waters, in
compliance with state appropriation schemes. Priority of the
right should be from the date of initiation and should not relate
back to the original date of the reservation.
All reserved water claims should be based on the original purposes of the reservation. A universal standard of quantification is
impractical because of the diverse purposes for which land is reserved.116 However, after determining the purpose of the reservation, the court should superimpose a requirement of reasonable
use and need. Should the present uses of a reservation appear to
be inadequate because of retarded economic growth or other factors, the court could include reasonably foreseeable demands in
the decree. Permanently quantifying reserved water rights based
on present use and needs would secure non-Indian water rights
from future preemption, a danger inherent in any open-ended approach. The Indians and the federal reserved land administrators
would also be assured of a definite quantity of water, safe from
encroachment by state water users. Increased federal or Indian
water needs could be met through compliance with state appropriation laws and limited to unappropriated, surplus waters in the
watershed. In areas where streams are fully appropriated, the
doctrine of eminent domain is available to ensure the unimpeded
so that they could make their homes on it and become self-sufficient farmers. Id.
at 2440-41. To permit non-Indian acquisition of the better, reserved water right
would be inconsistent with both the intent of the Act and the original purposes of
the reservation. Hence, the non-Indian water rights are solely state created and
are, therefore, junior to any Indian right.
116. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
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development of Indian and federal interests, while still protecting
117
the investments of established users.
COLLATERAL PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN ADJUDICATING RESERVED
RIGHTS

The Federal Trust Doctrine and the Interagency Conflict of
Interest in Adjudicating Reserved Water Rights
Over a hundred years ago the Supreme Court described the relationship between the United States and Indian tribes as being
so unique that nothing like it existed anywhere else in the
world.1 1 8 This unique legal and political association has sometimes been referred to as a "guardian-ward" or fiduciary relationship. The trustee for the federal-Indian trust relationship is the
United States Congress. Congress has been held to have "plenary
power" over the Indians.119 It is the only branch of the United
States Government that has the legal power to change the nature
or scope of the federal obligation under the trust. Congress can
even abrogate treaty rights unilaterally.120
Although Congress sets the policy to carry out the trusteeship,
the Department of Interior executes the trust through the Bureau
of Indian Affairs. The Department of Interior also administers
much of this nation's public lands under the jurisdiction of agencies such as the Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau of
Mines, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the National Park Service.
If the Department attempts to protect Indian reserved rights
which conflict with those of a sister agency, an irreconcilable conflict of interest exists within the Department. For example, in
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton121 the Secretary of the Interior's duty to protect the tribe's reserved water rights conflicted
with the simultaneous duty to execute upstream water delivery
contracts under the administration of the Bureau of Reclamation.
The Department of Justice faces the same conflicts of interest.
The Justice Department must represent the United States in all
117. For a discussion of the federal sovereign's power of eminent domain, see
Sotebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain,47 WASH. L. REV. 553 (1972).
118. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831). Justice Marshall's
opinion stressed that Indian tribes were not foreign nations, but rather, "domestic
dependent nations."
119. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
120. Id. at 565-66.
121. 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973).

suits to which the United States is a party.1 22 The Justice Department is frequently placed in the dubious position of simultaneously representing client-agencies whose interests are in direct
opposition.
Government officials have acknowledged the conflict of interest, 123 but claim they are nevertheless fully committed to fulfillment of their fiduciary duty to the Indians.124 However, in the
past the federal government has been less than conscientious
about enforcing Indian water rights. For example, in 1905 the Bureau of Reclamation constructed a dam on the Truckee River ten
miles above Pyramid Lake. The upstream diversions dropped the
lake surface level more than seventy feet and destroyed the
spawning grounds of the lake's indigenous fish population. The
lake's natural fishery is intimately tied to the livelihood of the
Pyramid Lake Paiutes, and the lake itself holds much cultural and
religious meaning for the tribe. The interests of the Bureau of
Reclamation and the Bureau of Indian Affairs were in direct competition. The tribe exhausted all of its administrative remedies in
trying to force the Department of Interior to exert Indian water
rights claims on their behalf against the Bureau of Reclamation
and other upstream users. In 1970, the tribe sued for a declaration
of rights and an affirmative injunction against the Secretary of the
Department of Interior with respect to the upstream water diversions by the Bureau of Reclamation.125 The district court upheld
the tribe's claims, holding that the Secretary's conduct was in violation of his fiduciary obligation.126 Compelled to uphold its
122. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1976).
123. See President Nixon's Message on American Indians (July 8,1970), quoted
in M. PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 597, 601 (1973).

[EIvery trustee has a legal obligation to advance the interests of the beneficiaries of the trust without reservation and with the highest degree of diligence and skill. Under present conditions, it is often difficult for the
Department of the Interior and the Department of Justice to fulfill this obligation. No self-respecting law firm would ever allow itself to represent
two opposing clients in one dispute; yet the federal government has frequently found itself in precisely that position. There is considerable evidence that the Indians are the losers when such situations arise. More
than that, the credibility of the federal government is damaged whenever
it appears that such a conflict of interests exists.
124. See Address by Leo M. Krulitz, Solicitor, Department of the Interior, to the
Federal Bar Association (April 21, 1977), Phoenix, Arizona, quoted in G. HALI, THE
FEDERAL-INDLN TRusT RELATIONSHP 32-33 (1979). Solicitor Krulitz stated: "Presi-

dent Carter, Secretary Cecil Andrus, and I are fully conscious of the federal government's trust responsibilities to Native Americans. We are intent upon seeing
those responsibilities fulfilled." See also American Indian Policy Review Commission's Management Study of the B.I.A.: HearingsBefore the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 15th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (statement of James A. Joseph,
Under Secretary, Department of the Interior).

125. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973).
126. Id. at 255-56.
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fiduciary duty, the Justice Department filed suit in United States
District Court in Nevada, seeking adjudication of tribal and federal reserved water rights throughout the Truckee River drainage.127 Named as defendants were some 20,000 water users.
Although the Paiute Tribe won a major victory against the Secretary of the Interior, over $212,395 was expended by the tribe in the
action. The tribe was denied court and attorney fees on appeal by
the government.128 In addition, the Department of Justice will
continue to represent tribal claims along with those of the Bureau
129
of Reclamation in the upcoming suit.
In cases in which there are conflicts of interest, Indians have
the right to employ private counsel. 3 0 However, when choosing
this alternative, the tribe must fund the litigation privately, as opposed to receiving federal funding from the Departments of Justice and Interior. In the Pyramid Lake controversy, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs has expended over two million dollars alone in preparing complex environmental studies in anticipation of the litigation.131 The availability of federal fiscal resources for adjudicating
and protecting Indian water rights and recent attempts to minimize internal conflicts of interest 3 2 indicate that the better choice
is to continue to seek federal assistance and representation in
protecting tribal water rights. If tribal water rights were perma127. United States v. Truckee Carson Irrigation Dist., 71 F.R.D. 10 (D. Nev.
1975), Civ. No. R-2987-JBA (D. Nev., filed Dec. 21, 1973).
128. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 499 F.2d 1095 (1974).
129. The Department of Justice has attempted to minimize this conflict of interest, however, by creating an Indian Resources Section in the Lands Division of the
Attorney General's Office. The section contains a cadre of attorneys whose sole
focus is on matters involving the fiduciary responsibility of the United States to
Indian tribes. At present, litigation under the auspices of this section primarily
concerns water rights, hunting and fishing rights, and rights to self-government.
See Indian Water Rights: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9
(1976) (statement of Peter R. Taft, Assistant Attorney General).
130. New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102, 1106-07 (10th Cir. 1976).
131. See Indian Water Rights: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practiceand Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,94th Cong., 2d Sess.
15 (1976) (statement of Hon. Reid P. Chambers, Associate Solicitor, Department of
the Interior). Mr. Chambers indicated that preparation of water rights cases requires complex water inventories. Quantification of water rights requires preparation of stream flow studies and detailed soil classification studies of reservation
lands, with attention to such characteristics as texture, slope, alkalinity, and topsoil depth. In addition, a detailed study of the history and culture of the tribe is
often pertinent when tribes seek to preserve waters for cultural or religious reasons.

132. See text accompanying note 129 supra.

nently quantified, the need for independent tribal actions to determine reserved water rights would be alleviated.
Conflicts Between Reserved Rights and State Statutory Schemes
Western Water Laws

From the state's perspective, the significance of the implied-reservation-of-water rights doctrine may be more fully appreciated

by an understanding of basic western water law. Deviating from
the common law doctrine of riparian rights,133 western water law
is largely an outgrowth of territorial mining activities. To preserve peace in the mining fields, the miners created their own
customs, usages, and regulations. The individual who made the
first use of available water had priority over all other claimants to
as much of the water as was applied to a beneficial use.1 34 The
custom became known as the doctrine of prior appropriation 35
and developed largely to protect monetary investments of established beneficial users.136 Once waters had been fully appropriated, new users could not divert water upstream and deprive a
miner of his established uses. The first user could appropriate all
of the water in any stream, as long as he applied it to a beneficial
use. 137 Moreover, in times of shortage, a senior appropriator's
rights were satisfied in full before a junior appropriator could as138
sert any part of his share.
133. The common law doctrine of riparian rights provides that the right to the
use of water belongs to those who have access to it through ownership of land. It
denies water rights to any landowner whose property does not abut upon a
stream, irrespective of need or purpose. 1 S. WEre, WATER RIGHTS INTHE WESTERN
STATES 748-50 (3d ed. 1911).
134. The miners established essentially the same rules for ownership of mining
claims and the right to use of water. The discovering miner was protected against
all who tried to jump his claim. Similarly, the first user of water was protected
against later takers. Id. at 72-74.
135. The Supreme Court in Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 459 (1931), defined the doctrine as follows:
To appropriate water means to take and divert a specified quantity thereof
and put it to beneficial use in accordance with the laws of the State where
such water is found, and, by so doing, to acquire under such laws, a vested
right to take and divert.., the same quantity of water annually forever,
subject only to the right of prior appropriations.
136. The doctrine was cognizant of the existing social and political climate, protecting the rights of miners, who by prior appropriation had taken water from the
natural beds and transported it for miles over mountains and ravines to supply
water to gold diggers. See Trelease, Arizona v. California:Allocation of Water Resources to People, States, and Nation, 1963 Sup. CT. REV. 158, 185.
137. See generally Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 457-58 (1879).
138. The rule of prior appropriation is not so harsh as it would appear. Subsequent reapportionment of available water among users as they entered the area
would eventually result in insufficient waters to allow anyone to prosper. As such,
junior water appropriators were encouraged to develop alternate ground water
sources, build dams to store flood and rain waters, transport water from greater
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In 1866, Congress acknowledged the custom by passing legislation declaring that water rights on public lands would be governed by local customs, not by common law.139 Further, the
Desert Land Act of 1877140 authorized the "appropriation" of surplus water on the nation's public lands pursuant to state and territorial laws. All western states have adopted some form of the
doctrine of prior appropriation.14l
The current federal reserved water rights law conflicts with
nearly every element of state appropriation schemes. State appropriation claims are considered to vest under state law whenever a specific quantum of water has actually been diverted from
the stream and put to beneficial use.142 Priorities are assigned
with first in time being first in right.143 Water rights obtained
under state laws may be sold or transferred,144 but are forfeited
by nonuse. 4 5 Contravening the western water laws, Winters docdistances, or purchase water rights from senior appropriators. Trelease, Water
Rights of Various Levels of Government-States' Right vs. National Powers, 19
Wyo. L.J. 189, 194-95 (1966).
139. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 151, 253 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 661
(1976)). Section 9 provides in part
[Wihenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested and accrued, and the same are recognized and acknowledged by the local
customs, laws, and the decisions of courts, the possessors and owners of
such vested rights shall be maintained and protected in the same; and the
right of way for the construction of ditches and canals for the purposes
herein specified is acknowledged and confirmed.
See also Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, § 17, 16 Stat. 217, 218 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 661
(1976)), amending the Act "of1866, extending its effect to all public lands. All future settlements of public lands were to be subject to any vested and accrued
water rights as acquired by prior appropriation.
140. Act of March 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (codified in part at 43 U.S.C. § 321
(1976)), states that one claiming water for the desert land entry must "depend
upon bona fide prior appropriation; and such right shall not exceed the amount of
water actually appropriated, and necessarily used for the purpose of irrigation and
reclamation."
141. The western states include Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. For a comprehensive review of state water laws, see A SUMMARY-DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS (R. Dewsnup & D. Jensen eds. 1973).
142. See Reno v. Richards, 32 Idaho 1, 178 P. 81 (1918); Huffine v. Miller, 74
Mont. 50, 237 P. 1103 (1925); In re Waters of Manse Spring, 60 Nev. 280, 108 P.2d 311
(1940); Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co., 99 Utah 139, 98 P.2d 695 (1940).
143. Veeder, Water Rights in the Coal Fields of the Yellowstone River Basin,40
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 77, 82 (Winter 1976).
144. Mt. Carmel Fruit Co. v. Webster, 140 Cal. 183, 73 P. 826 (1903).
145. See Smith v. Hawkins, 110 Cal. 122, 42 P. 453 (1895) (failure to use water for
a five year period constitutes statutory forfeiture of appropriated rights); See also

trine rights are not dependent upon beneficial use. The right is
for an unspecified quantum of water with a priority date of the
46
creation of the reservation.
This indefinite quantity of reserved federal water rights
presents the greatest conflict between the two doctrines. It is difficult for state officials to coordinate federal reserved water claims
with state water laws, administration, and planning. Owners of
privately held water rights are subject to having their established
uses diminished or impaired without compensation whenever re147
served rights are exercised on heavily appropriated streams.
State users, who rely upon state water laws to "vest" their water
rights, oppose the doctrine and the government's ability to take
their water without notice or compensation. State appropriation
rights often date from the late 1800s, and many streams were fully
48
appropriated under the state law by the turn of the century.1
Yet, these approved appropriations may be reduced or eliminated
at any time by the exercise of new, reserved water rights.
In the past, federal reserved claims were minimal and did not
unduly hamper state water administration or planning. In addition, many federal agencies voluntarily complied with state appropriation laws.149 States could determine with a reasonable degree

of certainty the quantum of water available for state uses. Forfeiture of waters not applied to beneficial uses or the sale of senior
appropriation rights often assured available waters for new users.
More recently, however, the Winters doctrine has received renewed vitality, sharply competing with increasing state needs. In
the wake of Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton,15o the Department of Justice has stepped up its efforts to adjudicate and proScott v. Temple, 108 Colo. 463, 119 P.2d 607 (1941) (abandonment); In re Drainage
Area of Bear River, 12 Utah 2d 1, 361 P.2d 407 (1961) (abandonment); 1 S. WEIL,
WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 603-622 (3d ed. 1911); Comment, Water
Rights-Failureto Use-Forfeiture,6 NAT. RESOURCES J. 127 (1966).
146. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
147. Generally, Indian rights pre-date most state water rights, being given a pri.
ority date from the time of the reservation's creation. All Indian treaties were negotiated prior to 1871, when Congress passed legislation which brought treaty

making with the tribes to an end. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1976). The Act declared that no
Indian tribe was to be acknowledged as an independent nation with whom the
United States could contract by treaty. The legislation did not, however, impair
the validity of existing treaties. Whenever new reserved rights are exercised, they
relate back to the original date of the reservation, divesting any later dated claim,
without compensation, no matter how long it may have been in use. For example,
an Indian reservation established in 1855, which commences its first use of water
in 1979, has a right to receive water ahead of any non-Indian water rights with a
priority date after 1855.
148. Palma II, Indian Water Rights: A State Perspective After Akin, 57 NEB. L.
REv. 295, 297-98 (1978).
149. See Ranquist, supra note 3, at 677-84.
150. 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973).
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tect both Indian and other federal reserved water rights.151 The
suits have substantial implications for the states and thousands of
private users named as defendants.15 2 All claims are adverse and
every defendant, including in some cases those using water only
for domestic purposes, must retain an attorney and personally defend his water rights. States, cities, and owners of privately held
water rights are overwhelmed by the financial implications of
such a suit. Under severe fiscal restraints, they are incapable of
matching their federal opponent's financial capacity to seek judicial protection of water rights. In addition, water rights suits are
notoriously lengthy and expensive, some continuing for over fifty
53

years.1

151. For example, in April 1979, major lawsuits were filed on four drainages in
Montana: the Flathead, Poplar, Milk, and Marias. In addition, litigation is pending
on two additional drainages in Montana-the Tongue and Bighorn Rivers. The
scope of the suits is staggering. On the Flathead Drainage, for example, Indian
water rights are placed in the battle arena with such federal interests as a national
park; two national forests; a national bison range; three wildlife refuges; a national
fish hatchery; portions of the Flathead River designated as a "Wild and Scenic
River" under the 1968 Act; power plant installations on federal lands; power plant
sites on Indian reservations; irrigation projects; and military bases. Named as defendants, along with the state, are upstream state private water users. The defendants are primarily small towns, farmers, and seasonal recreational facilities.
The suit encompasses surface and ground water users. Many are not major water
users and in fact draw upon domestic wells only for household uses or use "catch
basin reservoirs" for stockwatering. Many others are located several miles from
the river or any of its tributaries. United States v. Abell, Civ. No. 79-33M (D. Mont.,
filed April 5, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-3038 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 1980).
In a joint dismissal order dated November 29, 1979, United States District Court
Judges James F. Battin and Paul G. Hatfield dismissed all seven water suits pending in federal courts in the state of Montana. Notice of appeal was filed by the
United States Government with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, January 25, 1980.
152. E.g., United States v. City of Tucson, Civ. No. 75-39 TUC (JAW) (D. Ariz.,
order entered October 16, 1975). The Federal District Court of Arizona ordered
joinder of all surface and ground water users in the Upper Santa Cruz River Basin, consolidating suits brought by the Papago Tribe and the United States on the
tribe's behalf. The suit currently includes over 100,000 defendants and seeks to enjoin the city of Tucson and other state water users from mining ground water underlying the reservation.
153. E.g., United States v. Alpine Land and Reservoir Co., Equity No. D-183 (D.
Nev., filed May 11, 1925) is still pending. Another example is United States v. Orr
Water Ditch Co., Equity No. A-3 (D. Nev., Sept. 8, 1944) which was filed on March
3, 1913; the stipulated decree entered in that case is the subject of a current suit,
United States v. Truckee Carson Irrigation District, Civ. No. R-2987-JBA (D. Nev.,
filed Dec. 21, 1973), because the court failed to consider a reserved water right in
the Truckee River for the preservation of Pyramid Lake and its fishery.

The Source of Authority for Federal and State Water
Administrative Powers
Many states have asserted in their constitutions or by statute
that the waters of all natural streams, unappropriated by prior
users, are the property of the public and remain subject to appropriation as provided by state laws.15 4 However, the power of the
states to claim proprietorship of state waters must arise, if at all,
55
from the tenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
A state's right to establish laws for the administration and distribution of waters within its borders has long been recognized by
the Supreme Court.156 Moreover, the states assert that Congress
intended to allocate the ownership of water rights and the authority to control and administer water rights to the states pursuant
to statutory provisions enacted at the turn of the century. 5 7 The
states have traditionally administered and apportioned their state
waters without substantial federal interference for the past century. Even the Reclamation Act of 1902158 carried forward the policy of recognizing the state and territorial laws as the sources of
water rights, clearly providing that state water law would control
the appropriation and later distribution of the water. 5 9
Historically, it has been the policy of the federal government to
154. See, e.g., MoNT.CO ST. art. 3, § 15. See also Wyo. CONST. art. 8, § 1, which
provides: 'The water of all natural streams, springs, lakes or other collections of
still water, within the boundaries of the state, are hereby declared to be the property of the state."
155. U.S. CONsT. amend. X, which provides: 'The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved
to the states respectively, or to the people."
156. E.g., California Ore. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S.
142, 163 (1935), holding that "all non-navigable waters then a part of the public domain became publicijuris,subject to the plenary control of the designated states."
Accord, Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670 (1931); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 465 (1922); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 94 (1907); United
States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 702-03 (1899).
157. See notes 139-140 supra and accompanying text.
158. Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 389 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 372-73,
381, 383, 391, 392, 411, 416, 419, 421, 431, 432, 434, 439, 461, 491, 498). 43 U.S.C. § 383
provides:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or
to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to
the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation,
or any vested right acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior,
in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with
such laws ....
159. From the legislative history of the Reclamation Act, it is clear that state
law was expected to control the distribution of waters from federal projects. Representative Mondell, the principal sponsor of the Reclamation Bill in the House,
indicated that the "bill provides explicitly that even an appropriation of water cannot be made except under state law." 35 CONG. REc. 6687 (1902). Further, Senator
Clark, one of the principal supporters of the bill in the Senate, explained that "the
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encourage development of water resources by state water users,
even in drainage basins subject to reserved rights.160 With full
knowledge of its own reserved rights and its position as trustee
for the Indian reserved rights, the federal government nevertheless encouraged and frequently funded water resource development projects on streams subject to reserved water claims. The
states assert that the government's conduct implied that private
and state developments on those streams were proper and would
be secure. 161 Based upon that representation, the states claim
that the government should be estopped from now exercising
greatly magnified reserved claims without protecting the en162
couraged uses.
Despite past congressional deference to state water laws, the
control of the waters after leaving the reservoirs shall be vested in the States and
Territories through which such waters flow." Id. at 2222.
The Supreme Court recognized this Congressional intent in Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 614 (1945), holding that, "[a]lthough the government diverted,
stored, and distributed the water, the... ownership of the water or water-rights
[did not become] vested in the United States .... The government was and remained simply a carrier and distributor of the water. . . ." But cf. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), where the Supreme Court interpreted § 8 as not
requiring the United States, in the delivery of water, to follow priorities laid down
by state law; and the Secretary was not bound by state law, in disposing of water
under the Project Act. Id. at 586-87. Further, the Court held that the United States
intended to reserve enough water for the future requirements of Lake Mead National Recreation Area, a reservoir created by the Boulder Dam Project, under the
broad powers of the government to regulate navigable waters under the commerce
clause and the property clause, basing its decision on dicta in Ivanhoe Irrigation
Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958), and City of Fresno v. California, 373 U.S.
627 (1963). The dicta in Ivanhoe and City of Fresno were disavowed, however, by
the Supreme Court in California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), holding that
under the 1902 Reclamation Act, the Secretary of the Interior must follow state law
as to the appropriation of water and condemnation of water rights.
160. For example, the United States entered into a contract with the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California in 1933 for the construction and operation of Parker Dam as the diversion point for the Colorado River Aqueduct. The
project was built at a cost in excess of $200 million. The Parker Dam Project was
authorized by the Act of August 30, 1935, Pub. L. No. 409, § 2, 49 Stat. 1028, 1039.
Congress was aware of Indian claims on the Colorado River at the time the project
was approved. The tribal claims were later quantified at one million acre-feet in
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), decree, 376 U.S. 340 (1964). Should the
one million acre-feet be fully utilized by the tribes, the supply to the Aqueduct
would be nearly eliminated. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER PoucIsS FOR
THE FUTURE 481 (1973).

161.

NATIONAL WATER COMMSSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE

481 (1973).

162. For example, in Broder v. Natoma Water & Mining Co., 101 U.S. 274, 276
(1880), the Court observed that local appropriation rights were "rights which the
government had by its conduct, recognized and encouraged and was bound to protect."

judiciary has recognized limitations on a state's right to control

waters within its boundaries.163 The federal right to preempt
state regulatory controls resides in the United States Constitu-

tion. As such, federal regulatory powers are supreme, and the
federal government can perform these functions without interfer-

ence or impediment by the states.164 The basis for federal reserved rights claims largely rests on the property clause of the
Constitution.165 Because the federal government originally had
control over all the territorial lands by virtue of its sovereignty, it

has plenary power to control the property within the United
States, including public and reserved lands.
The federal government also supports the reserved water rights
doctrine on the basis of the commerce clause166 and the navigational servitude. 67 In addition, the war168 and treaty 69 powers of
the United States Constitution give the federal government authority to build projects that will strengthen the national defense
or comply with a treaty. Even the general welfare clause 70 has
163. United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899), holding
that:
Although this power.., as to streams within its dominion undoubtedly
belongs to each State, yet two limitations must be recognized: First, that
in the absence of specific authority from Congress a State cannot by its
legislation destroy the right of the United States, as the owner of lands
bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters; so far at least as
may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government property. Second, that it is limited by the superior power of the General Government to
secure the uninterrupted navigability of all navigable streams within the
limits of the United States.
164. U.S. CONST. art. VI, '"Tis Constitution, and the laws of the United
States... and all treaties ... shall be the supreme law of the land ......
Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all
165. Id. art. IV, § 3, '"e
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging
to the United States. .. ."
166. Id. art. I, § 8, 'The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes .... "
167. The navigational servitude is a court-created incident of the constitutional
power to regulate commerce. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190
(1824). Navigable waters in the United States are defined as "those waters that
. . .are presently used, or have been used in the past, or may be susceptible for
use to transport interstate or foreign commerce." 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (1979).
168. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Although the war power has not been used to bring
large scale projects in conflict with state laws, the court noted in Nevada v. United
States, 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958), that if the United States needed water for
national defense installations on the public domain, it need not "bend its knee"
and comply with state water laws that might interfere with the management of
property in the best interest of national defense.
169. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. E.g., 59 Stat. 1219 (1944); Colorado River Compact
art. I (c) (1922), guaranteeing Mexico a specific quantity of water from the Colorado River, must be kept to meet the nation's obligations, even though it may require curtailment of state water uses.
to pay the
170. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, '"The Congress shall have power ...
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been used to sustain federal power over western waters.171
Armed with the United States Constitution, the federal government is a formidable opponent for anyone seeking to assert water
rights. It appears to have almost unlimited jurisdiction over waters whenever a national or federal interest arises. 172 However,
federaf supremacy need not require disruption of state water systems and seizing of established uses without compensation.173
Coexistence of federally created water rights and state created
water rights for private and public purposes is achievable. 74
Since 1955, there have been numerous legislative proposals attempting to clarify the federal-state relationship over control of
western waters, but none has passed.175 Without a congressional
solution to the western water problem, states are subject solely to
the frequently inconsistent judicial interpretations of the redebts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United
States . .. ."
171. The famous case of United States v. Gerlack Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725
(1950), held that one of the largest federal basin-wide development projects, the
Central Valley Project in California, was constitutional under the general welfare
and taxing clauses of the Constitution.
[C]ongress has a substantive power to tax and appropriate for the general
welfare, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised for
the common benefit as distinguished from some mere local purpose....
Thus the power of Congress to promote the general welfare through largescale projects for reclamation, irrigation, or other internal improvements
is now ... clear ....
Id. at 738.
172. Trelease, Federal Limitations on State Water Laws, 10 BUFFALO L. REV.
399, 424 (1961).

173.

NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE

469 (1973).

The National Water Commission was extremely critical of the federal ability to
seize established state water uses without compensating the individuals, stating
"[c] onsiderations of fairness, accommodation and comity require that the United
States, whenever possible, acquire water rights and not just take water."
174. Trelease has concluded that the doctrine of reserved rights is entirely a
fiscal doctrine, asserting that the only significant function of a reserved water right
is to avoid payment of compensation for vested state water rights. Taking this
view, the efficacy of the entire doctrine is questionable. The costs of naming hundreds of thousands of state water users as defendants in complex litigation will
undoubtedly exceed costs of eminent domain proceedings on a case-by-case basis,
whenever increased reserved rights are needed. Further, meshing of federal and
state water laws could be more easily accomplished using negotiation processes,

rather than lengthy litigation. See F. TRELEASE, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN
WATER LAW, NATIONAL WATER ComMnssioN LEGAL STUDY No. 5 147a-m (1971). See
also Corker, Federal-State Relations in Water Rights Adjudication and Administration, 17 RocKY MTN. Mm. L. INST. 579 (1972).
175. See Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts over Western Waters-A Decade of
Attempted "ClarifyingLegislation," 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 423, 423 (1966).

served water rights doctrine.176
As the federal government begins to assert sweeping claims to
western waters, the conflict between state laws and the reserved
water rights doctrine becomes more critical. Acknowledging the
federal-state conflict over American water resources, President
Carter announced his Federal Water Policy Initiatives 7 7 on June
6, 1978. Part three of the four-part proposal addressed the improvement of federal-state cooperation and state resources planning. 7 8 President Carter expressed the belief that the federal
government should not preempt the states' responsibility for
water management and allocation because of the diversified role
of water throughout the United States. 7 9 Although proposing an
increased role and responsibility in water resources development
by the states,180 President Carter recognized that states are unable to allocate water in areas where reserved water rights have
not been determined.'18 Federal agencies have been ordered to
establish and quantify federal and Indian reserved water rights
through administrative means such as negotiation, using formal
adjudication as a last resort.182 Seeking adjudication of federal
and Indian reserved water rights in the courts on a wide scale is
contrary to the stated objective of pursuing administrative solutions.183 Complex litigation prevents the states from complying
with the Initiatives' directive to increase state control and responsibility in the management of state waters. Yet, states will be unable to begin comprehensive management of state waters as long
as federal and Indian claims remain unquantified.
SuIvmARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Legislative Solutions
To date, judicial determination has been the sole mechanism
for resolution of water rights conflicts involving reserved and
176. For a critical review of the reserved water rights doctrine as federal common law and its erratic and confusing application by the Supreme Court, see
Grow & Stewart, The Winters Doctrine as Federal Common Law, 10 NAT. RESOURCES LAw. 457 (1977-78).

177. I.L Doc. No. 95-347, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
178. Id. For a full discussion of the water policy initiatives, see Comment, Pres.
ident CarterAnnounces Water Policy Initiatives, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 191 (1979).
179. H.R. Doc. No. 95-347, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978).
180. Id. at 6.
181. Id. at 7. See also ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES POUCY DIVISION,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT'S WATER POLICY
INIrrTIAVEs 27 (1978).
182. H.R. Doc. No. 95-347, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1978).
183. See, e.g., note 151 supra.
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state water rights.184 The system is expensive, inefficient, and frequently inconclusive.185 Congress has at various times funded
major studies and created commissions to review the problem,
but has failed to act upon any of the recommendations.186 To
achieve a complete resolution of the conflict, Congress must take
the initiative and pass legislation that would: (1) limit all reserved water claims to reasonable present needs and uses; (2)
provide an administrative mechanism for permanently determining the reserved water rights in cooperation with comprehensive
state water administration systems; (3) provide that whenever a
reservation is withdrawn from the public domain in the future,
water requirements would be expressly reserved and limited to
any unappropriated surplus waters; (4) provide that future federal and Indian water needs should be met by compliance with
state appropriation schemes and limited to unappropriated surplus waters in the watershed or obtained through the power of
eminent domain; (5) provide under equitable considerations that
compensation be awarded whenever federal and Indian water
needs preempt established state uses. Application of these recommendations would remove the open-ended feature of the present doctrine and allow both the reserved water rights users and
state water rights users to deal with a definitive quantity of water.
184. The Department of Justice is the only department of the federal government that may initiate adjudication of water rights reserved by the United States.
See Ranquist, supra note 3, at 678. The Supreme Court is the only court with jurisdiction to adjudicate Indian water rights on an interstate watershed, along with
the rights of all other claimants. If the Court declines to hear the controversy, the
water rights cannot be established in final relation to one another regardless of the
desire of affected water users to have their claims determined. Id. at 717.
185. See note 153 supra. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) grants a federal court discretion in
a removed case to hear only those claims presenting a federal question and remand all other matters to the state courts for determination. When this occurs, it
results in two separate court systems simultaneously litigating claims to a limited
supply of water on the same watershed. The decrees are frequently fraught with
inconsistencies.
186. See, e.g., PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW CommssIoN, ONE-THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND 144, 146 (1970). The Public Land Law Review Commission advised:
Recommendation 56: The implied reservation doctrine ... be clarified
and limited by Congress in at least four ways: (a) amounts of water
claimed, both surface and underground, should be formally established;
(b) procedures for contesting each claim should be provided; (c) water requirements for future reservations should be expressly reserved; and (d)
compensation should be awarded where interference results with claims
valid under state law before the decision in Arizona v. California.
See also NATIONAL WATER COMNMISSION, WATER POLCmS FOR THE FUTURE 459-83
(1973).

Judicial Solutions
In view of the past inability of Congress to settle the conflict between federal, Indian, and state water rights, an immediate congressional solution is questionable. Absent that legislative
solution, the judiciary is the sole forum for resolving these controversial issues and the problem of inconsistent application and interpretation of the implied-reservation-of-water rights doctrine
will likely continue. However, the Supreme Court has provided
some guidelines, which, if employed by the lower courts, would
help minimize the inconsistencies. The trend of narrowly limiting
the implied-reservation-of-water rights doctrine to the original
purposes of the reservation when quantifying non-Indian reserved water rights should be extended to Indian reserved water
rights. In the past, even narrow interpretation of an agrarian purpose as the original purpose for which Indian reservations were
created has provided more than adequate quantities of water for
Indian tribes.187 The courts should also impose a requirement of
reasonableness, demonstrated by present needs and uses, when
quantifying the reserved Indian water right. Populations on the
reservations have been declining in recent years and greatly expanded domestic and agricultural needs on the reservations will
probably not be required. However, reasonably foreseeable future domestic and agricultural needs could easily be accommodated in the decrees where reservation development is minimal.
Whenever Indian and federal reserved claims are situated on
heavily appropriated streams, the courts should attempt to
achieve an equitable solution in resolving the water rights controversies on those streams. As currently applied, the doctrine permits new reserved water rights uses to eliminate state and private
uses, including nominal domestic uses, should insufficient quantities of water be available to meet the new reserved rights needs.
Although the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California'88explicitly
rejected the doctrine of equitable apportionment as a means of
quantifying implied-reservation-of-water rights, the Court should
reevaluate and reject that stance. Unlimited quantities of reserved rights endanger the established state water rights and the
prosperity of the water-needy western states. By equitably apportioning a limited resource among its users, according to reasonable need, a court would promote the best use of a scarce
resource. It could simultaneously protect established uses, while
still ensuring adequate levels of water for the efficient management and protection of reserved federal lands.
187. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
188. 373 U.S. 546, 597 (1963).
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Four decades ago, Justice Holmes decribed a river as "more
than an amenity, it is a treasure. It offers a necessity of life that
must be rationed among those who have power over it."189 The

concept of fairly rationing waters among all users has been used
by the Supreme Court in dealing with interstate stream allocations. The doctrine of equitable apportionment was first applied
to an interstate stream in Wyoming v. Colorado.190 The Court
settled the dispute by apportioning to each state a just and reasonable share of the benefits of the stream's flow. Although the
doctrine of equitable apportionment retains some of the nebulous
aspects inherent in the present methods of quantifying reserved
water rights, the doctrine imposes a more equitable solution and
allows the Court to quantify rights once and for all. Moreover, the
Court generally attempts to protect existing rights under the equitable apportionment doctrine'91 and recognizes a hierarchy of
use, ensuring protection of at least nominal domestic and agricultural needs for all classes of users. Should the government or Indian tribes need additional quantities of water at a future date,
the federal government still has the doctrine of eminent domain,
with its accompanying right to compensation, at its disposal to
procure additional water. The use of the power of eminent domain would enable increased water allotments to meet the expanded needs of federal and Indian reservations, but would also
compensate established state and private users for their displaced rights and investments, thus easing economic hardships.
By dealing with the water needs of the federal reserved lands and
Indian tribes under the doctrine of equitable apportionment and
the federal powers of eminent domain, the costs of compensation
are treated as a national obligation. Expansive reserved water
rights needs would be funded from the Treasury rather than
borne by a select group of local individuals. In addition, compen189. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931).
190. 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
191. For example, in Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945), the Court
stated:
Apportionment calls for the exercise of an informed judgment on a consideration of many factors .... physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in the several sections of the river, the character
and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses ... the practical
effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former-these are all relevant factors. They are merely
illustrative, not an exhaustive catalogue.

sation would ease the inequity of displacing large investments in
irrigation and municipal water supplies made over the decades.
Each western state should develop a comprehensive scheme for
the continuous adjudication of all water rights with respect to
every watershed in the state. The Supreme Court noted with approval in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States 92 the system established by Colorado, indicating that it
provided an adequate forum for the proper and efficient disposition of water rights controversies.193 Establishing a separate state
water rights determination system for the comprehensive management of watersheds and the continuous resolution of controversies would promote more efficient resolution of general water
rights adjudications and thereby reduce interference with normal
alienation of property rights and the economic stability of the
concerned watersheds. The federal government would continue
to represent federal and Indian water rights interests within that
forum. The separate system would eliminate the present problem
of delay because of crowded state and federal court dockets,
bringing a controversy to a more rapid conclusion. A special
water adjudication court would have the advantage of specialized
expertise applying both state and federal water laws on an exclusive and comprehensive basis.
CONCLUSION

The demand for western waters will soon exceed the present
sources of supply. Conflict between the states and the federal
government over the control and use of that supply will continue
to grow sharper, and serious confrontations can be expected. The
legally superior reserved water rights preempt later dated state
water claims, including domestic uses. Unquantified, open-ended
reserved water claims disrupt state water systems and impede
sound, coordinated planning.
Basing their argument upon Indian sovereignty rights, Indians
assert that their water rights claims are distinct from other reserved federal claims, and they seek expansive reserved water
rights under the doctrine of implied-reservation-of-water rights.
The most controversial and least justifiable aspect of those expansive claims involves the right to market the reserved rights for offreservation uses, potentially destroying state water adi.ninistration and distribution schemes. In addition, established state investments and uses may be preempted without compensation for
192. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
193. Colorado Water Rights Determination and Administration Act, CoLO. REV.
STAT. AN.

§§ 37-92-101 to 37-92-602 (1976).

CommenOs
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the water right or the investment in water resource projects when
these expanded rights are exercised.
A three-way conflict is inherent in any water rights adjudication
on watersheds where reserved water rights exist. States seek to
protect established state water uses against all reserved claims.
The federal government seeks control over the state regulatory
powers in order to protect its own perception of national and Indian water resource interests. Federal and Indian reserved
claims, meanwhile, are often diametrically opposed and the tribes
seek to force the federal government to carry out its fiduciary
duty to protect Indian water rights against both encroaching state
and non-Indian reserved federal water rights claims.
The Supreme Court has recently limited the reserved water
rights for non-Indian federal reservations, quantifying the rights
in terms of the amounts needed to fulfill the original purposes of
the reservation and no more.1 94 By limiting the federal and Indian water rights reserved claims to uses contemplated by the
original purposes of the reservation, unlimited water claims for
power plants, energy development, and water marketing would
not be included under the doctrine. However, until such time as
Indian and federal rights are permanently quantified and coordinated with state laws, water users relying on water from heavily
appropriated streams are subject to the displacement of longestablished uses without compensation.
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194. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700 (1978); Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976).
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